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 1. Introduction  
 
The transmission and control of infectious disease is strongly influenced by how people make 
choices, both individually and collectively, when presented with opportunities to engage in 
preventive actions or to utilise preventive health care services.  Researchers in the emerging field 
of ‘economic epidemiology’ analyse these choices by modelling aggregate behaviour on the 
premise that a rational individual’s decision with respect to vaccination is influenced by both 
economic and epidemiological incentives. Notable papers originating from that perspective, 
including Geoffard and Philipson (1996; 1997) and Francis (1997), argue that the fundamental 
objective of a rational agent, evaluating an option on the basis of the expected utility of the final 
outcome, is to find the optimum timing of vaccination. An important contribution of these models 
is that they clearly demonstrate the importance of dynamic feedback between individual choices 
regarding prevention and the aggregate infection rate.  
 
This paper builds on that literature, and seeks to extend it in three ways. 
 
First, it could be argued that choices regarding vaccination are more (or at least equally) plausibly 
represented as a static discrete decision – to vaccinate or not to vaccinate – rather than as a 
decision about optimum timing. In many countries, vaccination programmes are delivered as 
packages of public health services offered at specific points in time – for example, in post-natal 
care, at 18 months, at 6 years, and so on. On each occasion, an opportunity to receive vaccination 
is offered, and is either accepted or declined. Modelling these decisions as discrete choices made 
in response to each invitation may generate new insights into the determinants of individuals’ 
choices, and yield results in a form more compatible with predicting or explaining the 
achievement of stated public policy goals regarding vaccination coverage rates among birth 
cohorts.   
 
Second, although the prevalence of disease is important to individuals’ assessments of the risks 
of infection, the information individuals possess about aggregate level risks may be far from 
perfect. It is the individuals’ perception of risks that will influence their decisions. This becomes 
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particularly important given individuals’ decisions are based not just on perceived benefits of 
vaccination, but also the perceived risks of vaccination, such as those arising from adverse side-
effects. Understanding how individuals weigh up these various risks is crucial – for example, the 
spurious link between the Measles Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism made by 
Wakefield (1998), although scientifically lacking any credibility1, resulted in heightened anxiety 
among parents reflected in a sharp and sustained reduction in vaccine uptake in the UK (British 
Medical Association, 2003). This suggests that the perception of vaccine risk can undermine 
public health strategies, with serious implications for the ability to prevent epidemics. Modelling 
decisions as a product both of the risk of disease and of side-effects may allow us better to 
understand these influences. 
 
Third, decisions about vaccination are made under conditions of uncertainty, and the existing 
literature analyses these choices using the principles of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
expected utility (EUT) theory. In EUT, individuals are assumed to evaluate alternative 
vaccination choices on the basis of their expected payoffs, given their subjective beliefs regarding 
health outcome and probabilities of the corresponding states. However, there is ample evidence 
that individual behaviour is often not consistent with EUT2, which has given rise to alternative 
explanations of rational choice under uncertainty, including the role of regret in rational choice 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982). Regret theory (RT) arguably has intuitive appeal as an approach 
modelling vaccination decisions. A characteristic of these choices is that the risks of vaccine side 
effects is statistically small, but the side effects are (or are perceived to be) severe and permanent. 
Furthermore, many (although not all) of the public health issues which we might wish to analyse 
using these models concern childhood immunisation – where the decision to vaccinate is made by 
an agent (the parent) for the principal (the child). The potential for imperfect agency, combined 
with potentially substantial caring externalities between the principal and the agent (i.e., any 
adverse effects experienced by the principal may cause greater disutility to the agent than to the 
                                                 
1 Since Wakefield’s report, epidemiological studies carried out to verify this association found no causal link 
between temporal trends in MMR uptake and the incidence of autism. See Taylor et al (1999; 2002); Farrington et al 
(2001) and Kaye et al (2001) for empirical evidence. 
 
2 There is plethora of observed deviations from EUT (e.g., the Allais Paradox; preference reversal) in insurance 
demand models (Braun and Muermann, 2003).  Similar evidence is also observed in vaccination where parents are 
often reluctant to vaccinate their children even when risks (vaccine risk and infection risk) and benefits clearly 
favour vaccination (Connolly and Reb, 2003). This gives rise to questions about the ability of EUT to explain 
rational choice. 
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principal) suggest grounds for exploring the role of regret in modelling. Although we do not 
formally incorporate agency or interdependent utility functions here, we do examine the choice of 
vaccination under both EUT and RT and compare the implications of the theories for predictions 
about decisions to receive vaccination.  
 
The aims of this paper are, therefore, to propose new theoretical models for examining individual 
decision making regarding vaccination where (i) decisions are modelled as discrete choices 
which are (ii) a product both of the perceived risk of the preventable disease and of the risk of 
adverse side effects of the vaccine; and (iii) where individuals’ behaviour is modelled both as 
regret minimising and as expected utility maximising, and the results compared. The following 
sections describe our models and their implications for individuals’ decisions regarding 
vaccination. We conclude by highlighting the hypotheses that emerge and suggesting further 
research to test these. 
 
 2. Vaccination decision under uncertainty 
 
The economic epidemiology models of vaccination choices referred to above have generally 
considered two discrete health states – susceptible and infected – and included a cost parameter 
for adverse health events. This is applicable to vaccines that may have milder side effects, but the 
negative reaction to vaccination may involve a sustained loss of health status which, for many 
vaccinations, is irreversible. We have considered adverse events to affect both health status and 
income (loss of income) in the utility function in our framework to allow us to investigate the 
effect of these factors on vaccination decision-making.  
 
We consider a situation where vaccination is voluntary and an individual makes a choice for 
herself (this can readily be extended to the case where the parent acts as an agent for the child – 
the principal). Under this situation the vaccination decision can be modelled as a binary choice 
under risk. There are risks of infection, risk of severity and duration of illness when infected, and 
the risk of side effects associated with vaccination decision. Given the actual risks, an 
individuals’ decision depends on the perceived risk. Individuals face a trade-off between the risk 
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of infection and the risk of vaccine, and the decision to choose between two alternatives 
(vaccinate or remain exposed) is guided by the impact of the above risk on their utility.  
 
Consider a utility function for an individual who derives utility from consumption of a composite 
material good (x) and from health (h)3. The individual has certain monetary income (y).  Under 
certain conditions maximising is equivalent to maximising where ),( xhu ),( yhu y  is the full 
income and h represents discrete health states. h can take three values,  where s 
represents susceptible, i represents infected and z represents adversely affected health state. The 
individual faces a risk of contracting an infectious disease, the probability of which is given by 
],,[ zish∈
],1,0(∈ρ  which is exogenous to the individual.4 The individual faces monetary loss5 ( c ) when 
he is infected, and this loss is assumed to depend on income, )(ycc = . We assume that these 
costs are linearly related to income, yczc z=)(  and ycic i=)( . It is rational to assume that  
and , since illness leads to absence from work for a certain period of time.
0>c
]1,0[∈′c 6 The intensity 
of the loss depends on the nature of health state; for example, an adverse health state has much 
greater monetary loss than that of an infectious state.7 This allows us to incorporate heterogeneity 
in the model where a high income individual will lose more income than a low income 
individual.  
 
We assume that the individual’s utility function is concave in each health state ( , and 
), and for each level of income , and 
0>′yu
0<′′yu ],[],[ yiuysu > ],[],[ yiuysu yy ′>′ . 
 
The model assumes that vaccination is ‘free at the point of demand’ i.e. that there is no price 
charged for receiving the vaccine, either because of full subsidisation or complete insurance 
coverage. 
 
                                                 
3 Health is a multidimensional concept, but it can be transformed into a single variable. For example, a widely used 
single variable is the number of quality adjusted life years (QALYs). 
4 The risk of disease can be endogenous where the individual believes that her preventive action will lower the 
probability of infection rather than just eliminating the risk of infection. 
5 Infectious state incurs time and pain, all of which can be converted to monetary terms.  
6 This is extended to the case where a parent is acting as an agent for the principal, their child, given that ill health of 
child will result in loss of earnings for the parent.  
7 Since serious adverse events have longer period of illness than infected state and therefore  ).()( iczc >
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Case 1: Perfect immunity threshold probability 
 
Consider a situation where the vaccine provides perfect immunity, but there is probability of 
adverse side effects with probability ]1,0(∈φ . When there is possibility of sustained adverse 
effects and the corresponding health state is z, then the expected utility of a person who choose to 
be vaccinated is given by8  
 
EU vaccination ),(),()1( ycyzuysu z−+−= φφ  
 
The expected utility of a person who decides not to be vaccinated is  
 
EU exposed ),()1(),( ysuycyiu i ρρ −+−=  
 
The individual is indifferent between the choice if and only if 
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The left hand side of the expression provides a measure of relative risk of morbidity attributable 
to infection compared to the risk of morbidity attributable to the vaccine. This ratio tells us how 
many times more dangerous is the natural infection compared to vaccine, which is termed as the 
subjective critical probability. An individual will choose to vaccinate when her perceived 
(expected) relative risk of infection to risk of side effects is above this threshold level.  
 
                                                 
8 In some health care systems the individual may incur some financial cost of vaccination in the current period, while 
the expected benefits accrue in the current period and from the subsequent periods. Here we consider a simple case 
where individuals don’t have to pay for vaccination and consider a static decision-making setting. A static model 
ignores the role of time preferences in vaccination, which underestimates the cost of disease. We have adjusted that 
problem by making cost of disease a function of loss of income. 
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Individual decision rule: For a given subjective risk of infection relative to risk of side effects 
( ), the individual will decide to be vaccinated, if and only if ; and will remain 
unvaccinated otherwise. As  increases, the propensity of individuals to get vaccinated 
declines. 
SP
*
SS PP >
*
SP
 
Comparative static for case 1 
 
Loss in utility due to side effects [ ),(),( ycyzuysu z−− ]: The higher the expected loss in utility 
from adverse side effects, the higher is the critical subjective probability. A rise in the risk of 
adverse events reduces an individual’s propensity to vaccinate. This also shows that the threshold 
probability is increasing in income since the losses arising from vaccination side effects are 
increasing in income.  
 
Loss in utility due to infection [ ),(),( ycyiuysu i−− ]: The higher the expected loss from 
infection, the lower the threshold level of probability above which individual decides to get 
vaccinated.  
 
Case 2: Imperfect immunity threshold probability 
 
In a situation where the vaccine does not provide perfect immunity, it is rational to assume that 
an individual believes that vaccination reduces the probability of infection rather than completely 
eliminating the risk i.e., the probability of infection is higher if not vaccinated (ρH) than that if 
vaccinated (ρ). If there are three states of health (susceptible, infected and adverse state), then the 
expected utilities of two decision alternatives are as follows: 
EU vaccination ),(),(),()1( ycyzuycyiuysu zi −+−+−−= φρφρ  
EU exposed ),(),()1( ycyiuysu iHH −+−= ρρ  
Individuals are indifferent between the choice if and only if 
 
),()1(),(),(),()1(),( ysuycyiuycyzuysuycyiu HiHzi ρρφφρρ −+−=−+−−+−  
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When vaccine efficacy is less than perfect it can be assumed that He ρρ )1( −= , where  is the 
expected efficacy of the vaccine. Incorporating this condition in the above expression: 
e
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An individual will chose to vaccinate when her perceived (expected) relative risk of infection to 
risk of side effects is above this threshold level. The only additional term with this threshold 
probability ( ) is the perceived efficacy parameter ( ).  has an inverse relationship with the 
threshold probability. The higher the e , the lower is possibility of infection in vaccination as 
compared to exposed situation, and therefore the larger the propensity to accept vaccination; and 
vice versa. Other comparative static results are similar to those found in case of perfect immunity. 
**
sP e e
 
3. Regret Theory 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty it cannot be guaranteed that the choice made on the basis of ex 
ante calculations will be optimal ex post. Ex ante an agent may have inaccurate perceptions of the 
probabilities of states occurring or may have imperfect information about the efficacy of the 
vaccination technology, which would affect her payoff, but the information is external to the 
agent (Besley, 1989). Under this situation ex ante optimal choice may diverge from what is ex 
post optimal. Regret theory, as proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982), is relevant in this case 
where the concerns of rational agents are not limited to their payoffs only. There is potential 
regret, which plays a role in the choice under uncertainty. The foundation of regret theory is that 
people experience regrets if their decision turns out to be ex post sub optimal even if it appeared 
optimal with beliefs and information available ex ante (Dodonova, 2002). This intuitive 
assumption implies that an individual’s utility function should depend on the factual decision 
outcome and also on the counterfactual outcome that might have occurred had one chosen 
differently (Braun and Muermann, 2003). There is a large body of evidence9 to suggest that regret 
                                                 
9 See Loomes and Sugden (1982; 1987), Bell (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Connolly and Zeelenberg 
(2002) for evidence on instances where regret theory can help to explain behaviour that has been represented as 
irrational behaviour by expected utility theory. 
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theory can explain deviations from EUT that has been observed in many economic, financial 
situations and in experimental data.  
 
Regret theory (RT) is arguably particularly relevant for modelling individuals’ vaccination 
choices. With the protection afforded by vaccination, there is a low probability of infection, but 
there is new risk of adverse health states arising from vaccination side-effects – and in the case of 
the decision not to vaccinate i.e. to remain exposed, most people eventually recover from the 
infected state even without any protective action. So there is potential source of regret if people 
end up experiencing adverse health states caused by choosing to take protective action and if the 
cost of experiencing an infected health state is large in the case of the decision to remain exposed. 
Regret theory enables us to model decision making as an attempt to minimise the regret arising 
out of health states and the cost associated with health states. 
 
 
Regret theoretical expected utility function (RTEU): In RT the expected value of a state 
consists of a baseline utility (equal to that derived by EUT) plus an element of expected 
regret/rejoice compared with alternative state that could be attained if an alternative choice had 
been made. The regret theoretical utility function of a representative regret-averse consumer can 
be expressed as  
 
[ ]),(),(),(),( maxmax yhvyhvGyhvyhu ccc −−= , where 
 
(.)cv is a traditional Bernoulli utility (value) from action c (as represented by subscript c) which is 
concave (  and ) and is the regret function that depends on the difference 
between the value of actual level and ex-post optimal level of health status and income(h
0>′v 0>′′v (.)G
max, 
ymax).10 Regret function  is convex ((.)G 0>′G  and 0>′′G ) and 0)0( =G . This utility function is 
derived from regret theory as formulated by Loomes and Sugden (1982). The above regret 
theoretical EU function can be modified as 
 
                                                 
10 (hmax, ymax) is the health and income that the individual could have received if he had made the optimal choice with 
respect to realised state of the nature. 
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[ ]),()(),(),( yhvxEOGyhvyhu ccc −−=  
 
where  is the expected outcome from alternative action , which is also ex-post optimum. 
This modified RT utility function allows for differences in the probabilities of each state of the 
world compared to original formulation of RT where the outcomes differ according to the action 
chosen, but the probabilities remain the same. This modification of RT makes it more flexible to 
its application to problems of health care decision making (Smith, 1996). In order to derive the 
RTEU for an action we have to know the utility of each state, discussed below. 
)(xEO x
 
The regret-adjusted expected utility matrix for the decision to seek vaccination and the decisions 
to remain exposed (not to vaccinate) are as follows: 
 
 Susceptible (s) Infected (i) Adverse event (z) 
Vaccination  ],[),( VsGysu −  ],[),( ViGycyiu i −−  ],[),( VzGycyzu z −−
Exposed  ],[),( NVsGysu −  ],[),( NViGycyiu i −− --------- 
 
The first argument of  function represents health state ( ) and the second argument is for 
choice (V  for vaccination and  the choice to remain exposed). We assume that  
][,G zis ,,
NV
 
(a)  which implies that there is no regret at the susceptible state from 
either choices, 
0],[],[ == NVsGVsG
(b)  which indicates that regret from exposed decision is higher than that from 
vaccination decision, 
],[],[ ViGNViG >
(c) , which implies that regret from side effect from vaccination choice is 
larger than the regret from resulting loss from infection due to exposed decision, 
],[],[ NViGVzG >
(d) From exposed decision there is no possibility of adverse events.  
 
Regrets from other possible states are as follows: 
  
[ ] [ ])},(),(){1(),()(exp],[ ycyiuysuGycyiuosedEOGViG iHi −−−=−−= ρ  
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Regret from experiencing an infected state from vaccination choice (since vaccine is not perfectly 
effective) depends on utility cost of infection and net increase in risk of experiencing an infected 
state ( Hρ−1 ) as compared to infected state resulting from an exposed decision.  
 
[ ] [ ])},(),({)},(),({),()(exp],[ ycyiuysuycyzuysuGycyzuosedEOGVzG iHzz −−−−−=−−= ρ
Regret from experiencing an acute (adverse) health state from vaccination choice depends on the 
difference between utility cost of side effect and expected utility cost of infection from infection 
resulting from an exposed decision.  
 
[ ] [ ])},(),({)},(),(){1(),()(],[ ycyzuysuycyiuysuGycyiunvaccinatioEOGNViG zii −−−−−−=−−= φρ
Regret from experiencing infected state from the choice of remaining exposed depends on the net 
expected increase in the utility cost of infection (as compared to loss of infection from exposed 
choice) and inversely with the expected utility cost of side effect from a vaccination decision. If it 
turns out that the expected loss of side effect is higher than the net expected increase in cost of 
infection, people will rejoice from being in infected state.  
 
Case 3: Perfect immunity (when 0=ρ ) threshold probability 
 
[ ]{ }
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An individual is indifferent between the choice if and only if  
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where the critical probability,  depends on both baseline utility and regret element. The 
critical probability increases with the regret associated with the adverse state (from vaccination) 
and decreases with regret from infected state associated with the decision to remain exposed.  
*
RSP
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 Individual decision rule: For a given regret-adjusted risk ( ), the individual will decide to be 
vaccinated if and only if ; and will remain unvaccinated otherwise.  
RSP
*
RSRS PP >
 
Comparative static: 
 
(1) Threshold level of  increases with the utility cost of side effects and decreases with the 
utility cost of infection.  
*
RSP
 
(2) Threshold level increases with perceived regret from side effect, where the regret from side 
effect is inversely related with the perceived risk of infection from remaining exposed. Therefore, 
the higher the risk of infection, the lower is the , and therefore the threshold probability is 
lower. This implies that higher risk of infection induces an individual to vaccinate through 
lowering their regret from possible adverse health state that can arise from vaccination decision.  
],[ VzG
 
(3) Threshold level increases with perceived regret from infected state, which in turn is inversely 
related with risk of side effect. Therefore, the higher the risk of side effects (φ ), the lower 
the , therefore the higher is the threshold probability.  ],[ NViG
 
Case 4: Imperfect immunity threshold probability 
 
When the vaccine is imperfect, the regret theoretical expected utility for the vaccination and 
exposed decisions respectively are as follows: 
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ }
[ ] [ ]VzGycyzuViGycyiuysu
ycyiuysuycyzuysuGycyzu
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An individual is indifferent between the choice if and only if  
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Individual decision rule: For a given regret-adjusted risk ( ), the individual will decide to be 
vaccinated if and only if ; and will remain unvaccinated otherwise.  
RSP
**
RSRS PP >
 
Comparative static: This critical probability indicates similar comparative static conclusions to 
those found in the perfect immunity case with new addition of perceived effectiveness of vaccine. 
Here, the higher the perceived effectiveness of vaccine, the lower is the threshold point and the 
larger is the propensity to accept vaccination. If we impose an additional assumption that 
, then the threshold probability reduces to ],[],[ ViGNViG =
eNViGycyiuysu
VzGycyzuysu
P
i
z
RS
H 1.
],[)],(),([
],[)],(),([** ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−
+−−==φ
ρ  
 
4. Comparison of decisions based on EUT and RTEU 
 
The predictions of both EUT and RT of consumer behaviour regarding vaccine acceptance have 
some similarity. In both theories, individuals’ propensity to accept vaccination is found to be 
negatively related to the risk of the vaccine (as threshold prevalence increases) and positively 
related to the risk of infection (as threshold prevalence decreases). However, although the 
directions of the relationships are similar, the implications of the theories are dissimilar. In EU 
theory, threshold probability depends only on relative disutility of infection as compared to 
vaccination related disutility. But in RTEU, the threshold probability depends on both relative 
disutility and relative regrets. A comparison of threshold probability under both theories is 
discussed below.  
 
Other things remaining the same, since , therefore in both perfect immunity 
and imperfect immunity case, we find that 
],[],[ NViGVzG >
 
(a) Perfect immunity: 
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(b) Imperfect immunity: 
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The higher threshold probability under RT indicates that given a subjective relative risk, an 
individual has a lower propensity to vaccinate if she considers both actual payoff and counter-
factual outcome than the case in EUT where only direct payoffs are considered. These results 
would be useful in investigating some empirical evidence associated with vaccination decisions 
where possible regret may arise. 
 
 The extent of the effect of these risks on propensity to accept vaccination can be analysed in 
terms of their effect on welfare. This can be analysed by considering monetary measures of risk 
in vaccination.  
 
Case 5: Perfect immunity CV 
 
EUT: An individual (who has preferences for vaccination) aims to maximise   
 
),(),()1( ycyzuysuEU znvaccinatio −+−= φφ  
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This reveals how much the individual’s wealth must increase in order to compensate him for 
infinitesimal increase in the risk of vaccine to keep utility to the original level. This is known as 
the Hicksian Compensating Variation (CV) (Zweifel , 1997; Johansson, 1995) for a change in risk 
because welfare change is measured at the original utility level. This required compensation is 
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positive because the increase in risk has made the consumer worse off and therefore a positive 
level of compensation is required to return the consumer to the original level of utility.  
 
The CV expression, as expected, indicates that it is increasing with ‘perceived loss in utility from 
infection’ [ ] and increases with marginal utility of income ( ). But, the 
higher the marginal utility, the smaller is the CV, which implies that higher income groups are 
more likely to vaccinate their child (as low required compensation is equivalent to more willing 
to vaccinate) compared to lower income groups.  
),(),( ycyzuysu z−− yu ′
 
The cost (anticipated cost) of side effect has important implication on CV. CV increases with 
anticipated cost of side effect ( 01)( 2 >=∂
∂
zz cc
CV
φ ). This perceived cost of side effect is assumed 
here to depend on income. Knowledge about the severity of vaccine related side effect has great 
influence in determining this perceived cost, and may explain vaccination choice varies across 
and within socioeconomic groups.  
 
RT: An individual (who has preferences for vaccination) aims to maximise  
 
[ ]{ })},(),({)},(),({),(),()1( ycyiuysuycyzuysuGycyzuysuEU iHzznvaccinatio −−−−−−−+−= ρφφ
{ }{ } )6.(....................],[)][)1(][{)]}[)1(][{][)1(][)1( ],[)()( VzGiucsuzucsuzucsu VzGzusuddy yyiyHyzyyzy ′′−−′−′−−′−′−+′−
+−= ρφφφφ                          
 
CV is positive if and only if the denominator of the above expression is positive, which leads to 
the condition that ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
′−′−′−′
′+′−<
]}[][{]}[][{
][][)1(1],[
iusuzusu
zusu
VzG
yyHyy
yy
y ρ
φφ
φ . This condition implies that 
the expected utility of vaccination relative to marginal utility cost of vaccination (over and above 
marginal utility cost of infection) must be larger than the regret from side effects.  
 
Comparative static results on the CV provide a number of important results:  
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• CV is increasing in ‘perceived loss of utility from infection’ [ ].  ),(),( ycyzuysu z−−
• CV is increasing in regret from vaccination associated with adverse health state .  ],[ VzG
 
Similarly we find that the CV for a change in probability of infection is as following: 
{ }{ } ],[][)1(][{]}[)1(][{][)1(][)1( )()(],[ VzGiucsuzucsuzucsu iusuVzRddy yyiyHyzyyzyH ′′−−′−′−−′−′−+′−
−−= ρφφφ
φ
ρ  
 
This indicates that the CV is decreasing in the probability of the alternative outcome. This is 
intuitively interesting, because when the risk of infection from the decision to remain exposed to 
disease rises, people would be would be more willing to vaccinate, even at lower compensation.  
 
Comparison of the CV (risk of vaccine) shows that individuals require more compensation under 
RT than that under EU if and only if the following condition holds: 
 
{ } ][)1(][)1( ][][],[][)1(][{]}[)1(][{][)1(][)1( ],[][][ zucsu zusuVzGiucsuzucsuzucsu VzRzusu yzyyyiyHyzyyzy ′−+′−
−>′′−−′−′−−′−′−+′−
+−
φφρφφφ
 
This result arises because the numerator of LHS is greater than that of RHS and the denominator 
of LHS is lower than that of RHS provided that the marginal utility of healthier state is higher 
than an inferior state. Under this condition it can be concluded that an individual needs to 
compensated more if his behaviour is regret theoretical compared to that when the individual is 
an expected utility maximiser. Therefore in a society with a continuum of individuals who are 
heterogeneous in terms of income, RT would predict a lower proportion of individuals as 
accepting vaccination than the coverage predicted by EU.  
 
Case 6: Imperfect immunity CV 
 
EUT: An individual (who has preferences for vaccination) aims to maximise   
 
),(),()1(),( ycyzuysuycyiuEU zinvaccinatio −+−−+−= φφρρ  
)7....(......................................................................0
][)1(][)1(][)1(
)()()( >′−+′−+′−−
−=
zuciucsu
zusu
d
dya
yzyiy φρφρφ
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 since  This reveals how much the individual’s wealth must increase in 
order to compensate him for infinitesimal increase in the risk of adverse events. 
.0),(),( >−− ycyzuysu z
 
)8....(......................................................................0
][)1(][)1(][)1(
)()()( >′−+′−+′−−
−=
zuciucsu
iusu
d
dyb
yzyiy φρφρρ
  
 
The higher the risk of infection, the higher the CV since ,0),(),( >−− ycyiuysu i  , 
and . This reveals how much the individual’s wealth must 
increase in order to compensate him for infinitesimal increase in the risk of infection.  
0],[ >′ ysu y
0],[ >−′ ycyiu iy 0],[ >−′ ycyzu zy
 
Comparing (7) and (8) it is evident that the CV for risk of vaccine is higher than that of risk of 
disease since  <  because the cost associated with adverse health events 
is larger than that of infected state, since the adverse health state has a longer duration than that of 
infected state. This is consistent with the adverse effects of vaccination that causes permanent or 
serious damage (as assumed in our analysis) as compared to that of infection. 
),( ycyzu x− ),( ycyiu i−
 
RT: An individual (who has preferences for vaccination) aims to maximise  
 [ ]{ }
[ ]{ })},(),({)},(),({),(
)},(),(){1(),(),()1(
ycyiuysuycyzuysuGycyzu
ycyiuysuGycyiuysuEU
iHzz
iHinvaccinatio
−−−−−−−+
−−−−−+−−=
ρφ
ρρφρ
 
{ }
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],[)()(
)(
D
VzGzusu
d
dyc +−=φ  
{ }
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],[)()(
)(
D
ViGzusu
d
dyc +−=ρ  
where, 
[ ]
[ ] ],[][][{]}[][{
],[][][)1(][)1(][)1(][)1(
VzGiusuzusu
ViGiusuzucsuiucD
yyyHyy
yyyHyzyyi
′′−′−′−′−
′′−′−−′−+′−−+′−=
ρφ
ρρφφρρ
 
 
The CV for an infinitesimal change in both ρ  and φ  will be positive when  0>D
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In the case of RT, the magnitude of the CV for risk of infection and risk of vaccine depends on 
the regret from vaccination associated with the infected state and the adverse health state. Since 
by assumption , the CV for risk of vaccine would be larger than that for the risk 
of infection.  
],[],[ ViGVzG >
 
Comparison of CV (risk of vaccine) between the utility theories shows that individuals require 
more compensation under RT than that under EU if and only if the following condition holds: 
 
{ }
][)1(][)1(][)1(
)()(],[)()(
zuciucsu
zusu
D
VzGzusu
yzyiy ′−+′−+′−−
−>+− φρφρ  
 
which holds on the basis of assumptions of the analysis. Therefore, under certain restrictions it 
can be inferred that in the case of vaccines that provide less than perfect immunity, people require 
more compensation under EU than under RT, leading to lower proportion of individuals 
predicted to accept vaccination. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
An individual’s decision regarding vaccination is modelled in this paper as being a binary choice 
under uncertainty – either to vaccinate or to remain exposed to the disease. The optimal level of 
vaccination of an individual therefore cannot be expressed as an interior solution, but can be 
expressed as a threshold condition. This paper has examined the vaccination decision making as a 
binary choice problem with the inclusion of adverse health as a distinct health state. Individual 
decisions to vaccinate are made with reference to a threshold level, where an individual benefits 
from being exposed until the subjective probability is below the critical level, and decides to 
vaccinate when this subjective probability is above the threshold level. The perceived threshold 
level is guided by the valuation of the risk of adverse effects relative to that of infection from the 
disease. It is generally expected that a rational individual, whose behaviour can be explained by 
expected utility theory, will decide to accept vaccination when risk of infection is high, and that 
of the vaccine is low. But the agents base their decision on perceived risk rather than the actual 
risk. Therefore under uncertainty and imperfect information, there is large possibility of non-
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realisation of ex ante expectation in the ex post situation. This implies that there is a potential 
source of regret associated with the vaccination decision. Further, it is found that a regret-averse 
individual will have a higher threshold probability – this suggests that their propensity to 
vaccinate is lower than that suggested by a simple EU model of decision making by a regret 
averse individual. It is also found that a regret-averse individual would require more 
compensation for a rise in risk of vaccine than that of a traditional expected utility maximiser.  
 
If consumers’ decisions are better characterised as regret theoretical than traditional EU 
maximiser, this may provide an explanation for the possible causes of low acceptance of vaccines 
in the face of increased fear of side effects. It is important to examine consumer behaviour in 
practice and see which of the theories appears better able to explain and predict empirical 
evidence about vaccination decisions. It needs to be mentioned here that the findings of this 
analysis rest on the assumption that individuals makes decision on a target level of accepted risks 
and that threshold level depends on individuals perceived utility of different health states. This 
analysis is a very simplified version of the actual situation where individuals’ valuation of health 
state depends on individuals’ heterogeneity in their ability and knowledge to process the 
information (regarding risks) to calculate their perceived risks. Nevertheless, the findings are 
useful and can be extended in numerous possible ways. Now, if this theory is applied to analyse 
vaccination choice then we need estimates of utility values across individual groups. Lastly, 
higher threshold risk under regret theory is based on some assumption which needs to be tested. 
Particularly, the assumption that the side effects of the vaccine are more severe/long-lasting than 
those of the disease is crucial and therefore estimates of regrets associated with different health 
states needs to known in verifying the theoretical findings.  
 
Both EU and RT, based on perceived risks, have some important implications regarding 
individuals’ propensity to vaccinate with reference to risk of vaccine and risk of disease. The 
behavioural response to risks under RT may provide a useful explanation of low vaccine 
acceptance. Perceived risk of infection ( ) and risk of vaccine ( ) is an expectation about the 
actual risks (
eρ eφ
ρ ,φ ). It is often found that the public has misperception about risks – for example, 
research has identified that public underestimate the risks from disease ( ) and 
overestimate the risk of vaccine ( ) (Hobson-West, 2003), leading to a situation where 
eρρ >
eφφ <
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subjective relative risk based on perceived risks is smaller than that of actual risk 
( ) ). Therefore when perceived risks do not converge to actual risks, EU theory 
would lead to a situation where less proportion of individuals will accept vaccination than that 
would have achieved when individual have known the actual risks. On the other hand the effect 
of   and  on critical regret 
/()/( φρφρ <ee
eρρ > eφφ < *R  is not unique - this will lead to net higher regrets 
from being exposed and net lower actual utility from being exposed, the critical *R  will be 
determined by the relative effect of these two. The net effect will depend on how individuals 
weight their regrets (from the counterfactual outcome) relative to factual outcome. It is therefore 
of immense importance to estimate perceived risks of individuals and see how evaluation of 
regret and factual outcome varies on the basis of perceived risk across individual.  
 
Risk perception is influenced by many factors which include actual risks parameters, media 
coverage, herd behaviour and so on: many of which influences cannot explicitly be captured in 
the theoretical framework discussed in this paper. Moreover, since risks are evolving by nature, it 
is crucial to know how individuals adjust their perceived risks in response to any new 
information regarding risk of infection and efficiency of vaccine. The analysis of individual’s 
choice was based on subjective risks, and doesn’t take any account of risks to the society. If 
individuals behave as rational agents, it may make sense to ‘free ride’ and refuse vaccination; the 
decision to free ride would be influenced by their perception of societal risk. If individuals 
perceive that everyone will vaccinate and the disease would be eliminated, they would feel regret 
from their decision to vaccinate. Similarly, if one perceives that infection will not be eliminated, 
he may experience rejoicing from his protective action. RT can be extended to the case where 
individual decision is influenced by aggregate societal risk which could provide better analysis of 
rational decision regarding vaccination. These issues, as well as empirical tests of the theoretical 
models reported in this paper, are being explored in our ongoing research. 
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